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Introductory remarks
Most of our contemporaries would no longer dis-
pute that the real role of the constitution and of consti-
tutionalism is to facilitate a productive interaction be-
tween reinforcing identity and preserving differences.
A number of issues relating to the constitution and con-
stitutionalism grow out of socio-political settings en-
circled by colliding and competing identities. These iden-
tities can be national, regional, linguistic, religious, eth-
nic, political, generational, class or ideological in char-
acter. In order to permit their expression and to harmonise
them with the basic principles of constitutionalism, a
framework has to be set up for a kind of interplay be-
tween identity and difference, a process in which these
competing agents and elements combine, diverge, and
so forth.
In their most elementary form, the fundamental
values of constitutionalism are the needfor checks and
balances in government, the endorsement of the prin-
ciple oflegality and theprotection offundamental rights.
Each of these basic characteristics of constitutionalism
seeks its legitimacy in relation to socio-political reality
oriented towards the conflicting poles of identity and
difference. Although each of these values has a role to
play in the interaction between identity and difference,
on this occasion stress is placed on the protection offun-
dam ental rights, since the present text focuses exclu-
sively on one group of rights. Bearing in mind the aim
and purpose of constitutionalism, the protection of fun-
damental rights, in the words of M. Rosenfeld, also
implies the existence of an ongoing tension between
identity and difference. Against the background ofthese
rights, the element of difference is to be found between
the individual citizen, on the one hand, and the collec-
tivity or the dominant majority, on the other. Without
this difference, the individual would not seek protection
against the encroachment of state authorities on the area
of his fundamental interests. However, the responsibil-
ity for the protection offundamental rights in the broad-
est sense of the term requires the existence of at least
two elements: first, consensus as to which rights are to
be regarded as fundamental, and hence provided consti-
tutional protection (this involves identity between the
authors of a constitution and those who are subject to
that constitution), and, second, the existence of another
type of identity linking all members of the community
as subjects of the same constitutional rights. In this man-
ner, the constitutional provision that all persons are en-
titled to the same respect and dignity generates the basis
for the identity of individuals who might otherwise con-
sider themselves different in some ways.
The question of identity versus difference is the
first to be raised whenever minority rights are concerned,
one of the most disputed issues of legal and political
theory and practice in the world today. It is the subject
of intense scrutiny by international public law, but also
by national public law, first of all constitutional law. Con-
troversies exist in both international and constitutional
law. A series of unsettled issues still remain in interna-
tional law, including, amongst others, even the defini-
tion of the word "minority". It is, namely, often argued
that in the current state of affairs it is impossible to ar-
rive at an internationally acceptable definition of the
term. Still, it must be stressed that situations ofthis kind
are not quite unknown to international law, and, once
formulated, the application of certain rules is secured
by tacit agreement about their subject. This also applies
to the identification of the subjects of application of in-
ternationallaw concerning minorities. It is precisely in
this area, more than anywhere else, that the presence is
felt of political considerations, which permit a degree
of flexibility in the individualisation of minorities for
the purpose of the needed special protection. This also
goes for the analysis of the historical evolution of the
multilateral system of minority protection, or of the re-
lationship between human rights and minority rights, a
controversial issue centring on the meaning and scope
of Art. 27 of the International Charter of Civil and Po-
litical Rights.
However, it needs to be stressed that the question
of the rights of minorities and their position within a
country's national legislation, i.e. within constitutional
law, represents a different chapter. Here we are concerned
above all with a number of specific questions. First, why
and in what way was traditional constitutional law forced
to incorporate new rights, among them minority rights,
and whether in the classification of constitutional rights
minority rights figure as a separate group of standardised
rights, and if so, what place do they occupy among the
minority rights? The second question to be considered
is the way in which the internal legislation, above all
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constitutional law, of the "post-modern" state, treats
minority rights?
About the transformation of the constitutional
paradigm in the "post-modern" state
As opposed to the individualistic concept of rights
in the 18th and 19th centuries, originating in Locke (all
rights are individual, rights come before the state), which
did not recognise group rights, the concept of rights
which evolved in the 20th century begins to name the
group as a means to realise the fundamental goals and
wants of individuals. In the early 20th century J. Ellul
asserts that the concept of individual freedoms should
be replaced by group rights if a society is to develop and
prosper freely. The acceptance that man is a social be-
ing gives rise to a special category of group rights, but
these rights have a place only side by side with indi-
vidual rights.
Two dominant ideologies of the second half of
the 20th century, the ideology of democratic liberalism
and that of Marxism, have had a large impact on the
positioning and proposed solutions to the problem of
minority rights as group rights, both at in international
level and in domestic policies of the states concerned.
In their essence, though, both of these ideologies are
hostile to the political reality of ethnic identification,
although, for reasons of political strategy, they have of-
ten expressed their interest in minority identification and
in the political activity this implies. Until recently,
Anglo-American and Western European liberal demo-
cratic societies provided guarantees for each human right
which they considered important enough to be regulated
on an individual basis. On the other hand, also until re-
cently, socialist societies attempted to guarantee human
rights on a collective basis. Of course, it is easily argued
that this difference in emphasis reflected different con-
cepts as to which factor - the individual or the collectiv-
ity - was at the centre of the "good state."
About the classification of rights
in constitutional documents
The authors of the first constitutions were, as we
all know, simple and practical people. The first consti-
tutions rarely contain the phrases so dear to the theoreti-
cians and apologetics of constitutionalism. The expres-
sion "fundamental rights", for example is not to be found
in the US Constitution. Its first ten amendments com-
prise in fact guarantees of the followingpersonal rights:
(I) freedom of religion, of speech, of the press, of as-
sembly, and of peaceful protest; (2)freedom to bear arms
for the purpose of setting up a well-trained militia; (3)
freedom from having soldiers quartered in one s home;
(4) freedom from search and arrest without probable
cause; (5) right to be tried by a Grand Jury, except in
military cases, and freedom from being twice put injeop-
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ardy of life or limb or having to be a witness against
himself; (6) the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury and the right to be informed on the accu-
sation, the right to obtain witnesses in one's favour, and
to have a counsel for defence; (7) the right of trial by
jury in civil suits where the value exceeds twenty dol-
lars and the prohibition of re-examination by another
court except according to the rules of common law; (8)
prohibition of excessive fines and cruel punishment; (9-
10) individuals enjoy other rights which are not enu-
merated in the Constitution or in the amendments, ex-
cept those delegated to the Federal Government, or which
are reserved for the States, or are prohibited to them.
The significance of the first ten amendments
added to the US Constitution in 1791 is in that they
charge the recently established federal state with the duty
to respect certain basic rights, while Amendment XIV
(passed in 1868) charges the individual federal units with
the same obligation. The rights provided for in these
amendments were expressed in negative terms: Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press;
the right to keep arms shall not be infringed; the right to
be secure shall not be violated; no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law; no fact tried by a jury shall be re-examined than
according to the rules of the common law.
The French Declaration of the Rights of Man
(1789), too, simply enumerates the rights and freedoms:
equality before the law (Art. 6), the principle of non-
retroactivity oflaws (Art. 8), freedom of expression (Art.
11), equality before state authorities (Art. 13), the right
to property (Art. 17), etc. In 18th century ideology, which
these two documents reflect, freedom is considered an
exclusively individual good. In order to achieve this sa-
cred individualism, the French Revolution broke down
all the existing groupings (the estates, corporations, con-
gregations). Grown out of the spiritual milieu of class i-
cal constitutional law, these and many other documents
dealing with the rights of man and the citizen exclusively
focus on the individual dimension.
Our century, in turn, brings with it a tendency of
socialisation and concretisation of rights and freedoms.
Many constitutions are made on this model. Among them
is the West German Grundgesetz of 1949, which can be
used as an illustration of classification of rights. Indi-
vidual freedoms continue to exist, applicable when a
person is regarded as an isolated individual; but there
are also collective freedoms, applicable to, and exercised
by, groups. That constitution draws a distinction between
freedoms that are ends in themselves (freedom of ideas,
freedom of religion, etc.) and freedoms that are merely
means to an end (freedom of association, freedom of
assembly, etc.). Another distinction that can be made is
between traditional freedoms and economic and social
rights, which first appeared in modern constitutions af-
ter 1919. In the most general sense, the latter freedoms
are not protected as strictly as this is done with tradi-
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tional freedoms. The authors of the constitution defines
the fundamental rights as being inviolable and inalien-
able, and equally directly applicable and binding for the
legislative and for the executive and judiciary branches
of government. Their essence must not be restricted (Art.
19/2). All rights are not expressed in absolute terms. The
wording of the constitution strives towards a balance in
the rights of the individual so as to prevent their use
against the "constitutional order or morality". Some of
the more recent constitutions seem to strive to
constitutionalise these tendencies.
There are countries, on the other hand, where eco-
nomic freedoms and rights are not incorporated in the
constitution, but are efficiently covered by ordinary leg-
islation (e.g. Belgium).
Even the first known constitutional documents
on human rights are currently supplemented by this new
dimension of socialisation and concretisation. Thus, for
example, the simplicity ofthe French Declaration of the
Rights of Man, as the primary source of the rights and
liberties of man and the citizen in France, have been
enriched by the contents of subsequently passed consti-
tutional documents. As a result, in France today, by the
will of the authors of the constitution, fundamental rights
derive not only from substantive law, the currently valid
1958 Constitution, but also from the 1789 Declaration,
the 1946 Preamble to the Constitution, and from the basic
principles recognised by the laws of the Republic. These
are rights recognised in a series of acts, primarily deal-
ing with the right to equality, the principles of national
sovereignty and democracy, or some other aspects of
freedoms (individual freedom, freedom of the press). The
distinctions drawn for the purpose of classification in-
clude the first category, involving rights inherent in hu-
man beings. These rights have their source in the 1789
Declaration (equality, freedom, security, resistance to
repression, etc.) The second category comprises those
rights which represent specific aspects or consequences
ofthe previously mentioned rights. For instance, the prin-
ciple of equality has aspects such as the equality of sexes,
equality before the law, equality in employment, equal-
ity and universality of suffrage, equal access to educa-
tion, training and culture, equality of conditions for the
exercise of freedoms. The principle of freedom has the
aspects of freedom of conscience, thought and expres-
sion and freedom of the press, as well as freedom of
religion, freedom of assembly, association and educa-
tion; the autonomy of university teachers, trade union
freedom, freedom to strike and, of course, individual
freedom. This category also encompasses the principle
of ownership and the principle of security. The third cat-
egory of fundamental rights involves the rights with
which the constitution endows collectivities, but which
require the passing of special regulations to be activated.
These are the right to employment, to the participation
of employees in collective bargaining, and the right to
participate in the management of enterprises, the right
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to a family, health protection, material security, to holi-
days, to leisure time, etc., etc .. The fourth category cov-
ers rights which are pivotal for the situation of the indi-
vidual but also decisive for the character of the state in
question. It is the right of territorial collectivities to free-
dom of government by elected bodies, freedom of self-
determination of peoples, respect for pluralism of modes
of socio-cultural expression, participation in political
bodies, and the right of expression through elections.
The last right determines the democratic character of a
state. To this can be added the division of powers, the
separation of the executive from the judiciary branch of
government, etc.
The same can be said ofthe Russian Constitution
(1993), where all rights are located in the second chap-
ter, with the statement that they are directly effective.
Basically, the list of rights is similar to those found in
Stalin's constitution of 1936 and Brezhnev's constitu-
tion of 1977, with certain additional provisions reflect-
ing the new era in the Russian state. These provisions
warrant the freedom of private enterprise, private own-
ership of land, and the right to a fair trial. Interestingly
enough, the 1992 Treaty on the European Union does
not contain a Bill of Rights. This circumstance repre-
sented from the outset the threat of the supremacy of
common legislation, but the opinions of the European
Court are gradually forming the stance that the protec-
tion of human rights constitutes an integral part of the
legal system of the Community. Stress is laid on the sig-
nificance of the "constitutional traditions" of the mem-
ber states and on the European Convention on Human
Rights (1950).
There is a discernible tendency in contemporary
constitutional law wherein the latest changes of interna-
tional documents dealing with minority rights, whatever
our opinion of them, are all focused on pluralistic dis-
course about the constitution. These changes, as many
authors point out, have added to this discourse another
important feature, namely, an even more resolute and
forthright attitude towards a more comprehensive ac-
commodation of pre-political group differences - eth-
nic, linguistic, religious. Side by side to the formerly
dominant constitutional paradigm, expressed through the
slogan: "Democracy as the promotion of human rights
against the background of the welfare state ", the emerg-
ing constitutional teleology is offering an alternative
syntagm: instead of, or together with, the fundamental
values of Liberty-Equality-Brotherhood, emphasis is
now on Security-Difference-Solidarity. In other words,
it is the material principles of peace and security, of to 1-
erance and the promotion of differences, and of social
justice which are today beginning to legitimise the po-
litical symbolism of human rights. All of this is the prod-
uct ofthe interventionist nature of the contemporary wel-
fare state, in which enormous efforts have been made to
reconcile the various generations of human rights and to
evolve a new relationship between the citizen and the
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state, but also between the state and the international
community. The growth and evolution of international
organisations and of the level of organisation in them,
the conduct of transnational operations but also the de-
velopments at national level, all of these comprise a
frame of reference which reflects with ever greater clar-
ity the trend of changing contents of the sovereignty of
the "state-nation". Proceeding from the rights defined
by international documents, the state today is required
to "respect and secure all individuals in its territory and
to subject them to its jurisdiction". This task is to be
performed regardless of differences in language or reli-
gion, or of national or ethnic differences. In other words,
when it comes to human rights, the state is to secure a
legal and administrative system that will apply to all in-
dividuals within its jurisdiction, a system that will al-
low no differences between the majority and the minori-
ties in the application of these rights. Evidently, then, a
series of important issues (economic, social, political)
is today determined at supra-state level. The post-mod-
ern tendencies, which sometimes over-emphasize the
signs of the gradual weakening of the role of the state,
and the weight of the demands made by the international
community on constitutional law and state authority need
not necessarily lead to chaos and anarchy. Anarchy can
occur without the state, but the state and its quality can
be further evolved and improved through international
cooperation, by the acceptance of common standards and
solutions to common problems.
About the question of minority rights
as collective rights
It is widely accepted that, with the discovery of
the state-nation (f'Etat-Nation), Europeans have created
a machine for the production of minorities. Although it
is often heard on the Old Continent that "Europe finds
its identity precisely in its diversity ", the restricted scope
of the application of this idea with regard to internal
minorities indicates that something is wrong. A good
illustration of this ambiguity is the hypocritical attitude
toward the legal situation of minorities in France. The
chief difficulty in minority protection in France stems,
namely, from the circumstance that the existence of mi-
norities is denied in France in order to assert the idea of
the "State-Nation". In fact, France is built upon this very
idea. Of course, there are communities on French soil
which could (and probably will, one day) be considered
minorities. Although they are not yet considered as mi-
norities, they have been recognised "the right to indi-
vidual difference ". This illustration from France directly
poses the question: How to reconcile the denial of the
existence of minorities on one's own soil with the real-
ity of a multicultural society? As we know only too well,
Croatia has not been spared this dilemma, either, after
attaining independence and sovereignty.
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International documents have oscillated in their
position on the concept of collective rights in general,
and of minority rights among them. This is due to the
ideological and political implications this notion carries
as much as to a whole range of other dilemmas, theo-
retical as well as practical. Prior to 1941, the interna-
tional community was favourably disposed towards
group rights. This is evidenced in an Advisory Opinion
of the Permanent International Court of Justice adopted
in 1935:
"The idea behind the Treaty on the protection of
minorities is to provide certain elements incorporated
in the state, whose population differs from them by race,
language or religion, the possibility for peaceful life side
by side, friendly cooperation between them, and at the
same time the preservation of characteristics which dis-
tinguish them from the majority, meeting certain needs
of theirs. In the endeavour to reach that aim, two things
are considered especially important...
first, ensuring that citizens belonging to racial,
religious or linguistic minorities are made equal in ev-
ery respect with other citizens,
secondly, ensuring to minority elements appro-
priate means for the preservation of their racial pecu-
liarities, traditions and national characteristics.
These two elements are closely related, so that
no genuine equality can exist between the majority and
the minority if the latter is deprived of its own institu-
tions, and if it is constantly denied that which consti-
tutes the very essence of its existence as a minority ".
After 1945, solutions concerning minority rights
as collective rights were the first to undergo an evolu-
tion. Despite blockades which prevented the international
community from concentrating on the issue of minority
rights (minority rule in South Africa, or the
assimilational, inward-turned nation-building design of
states which emerged from colonial rule, etc.), efforts
were made to reinforce minority rights as a concept of
international law. This is best shown in the process of
drafting of an important and recent UN document about
minorities:
The UN Declaration on the rights of persons belonging
to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities
(1992). In the course of the work on this document a
group emerged who advocated placing the promotion
and realisation of minority rights "within a constitutional
framework", that is to say, the state in question and its
constitutional laws would be practically the only guar-
antor of minority rights. However, this situation also sig-
nified a potentially subordinate position of international
law, and ofthe Declaration as the instrument of this law,
in relation to the constitutional law of individual states.
For this reason, the phrase that the promotion and
realisation of minority rights, like all other rights and
freedoms of man, occur "within a constitutional frame-
work" was replaced by the wording "within a democratic
framework founded on the rule of law", a wording which
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cannot be reasonably interpreted as restricting the ob-
jectives ofthe Declaration. On the contrary, the language
ofthe Declaration asserts the concept of democratic plu-
ralism, a notion which leaves its mark on the entire text
of the document. Consequently, the framework of the
promotion of rights is democracy and the rule of law,
rather than a special constitutional system, which need
not honour any of the objectives mentioned in the docu-
ment. This relationship between democracy, the rule of
law, pluralism and minority rights is common to all
OSCE instruments, and the UN Declaration also reflects
and supports this strong tendency which prevails today
in contemporary political thinking and complementary
standards in human rights.
Still, the possibility of conflicting interpretations
of the individual versus collective dimension of minor-
ity rights has not disappeared. This is borne out by the
formulations we find, e.g., in Art. 1 of the 1994 Draft
Convention which speaks about the protection of "na-
tional minorities" but also about the protection of "per-
sons belonging to these minorities". The explanatory
remarks accompanying the Proposal for the European
Convention for the Protection of Minorities stress also
that it is "... necessary to recognise the rights which do
not belong only to individual members of minorities but
also to minorities as such. since minorities are not merely
the sum total of individuals but represent a system of
relationships between these individuals. Without the con-
cept of collective rights. minority protection would be
thus restricted".
The constitutional documents of
the Republic of Croatia and minority rights
In the constitutional documents passed after 1990,
the Republic of Croatia has adopted an unquestionably
firm stance regarding the protection of human rights. The
constitutional guarantees for this are both the principle
of equality of citizens in rights and freedoms (Art. 14 of
the Constitution) as well as the willingness to respect
international law (Art. 134 of the Constitution). The
rights of citizens as individuals are supplemented by
certain "collective rights belonging to members of cer-
tain communities as a whole". The aspect of minority
rights as collective rights is particularly emphasised by
the adoption in 1992 of a special Constitutional Law on
Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National
and Ethnic Communities or Minorities. However, in spite
of the essential "consistency with the principles of par-
liamentary democracy, the protection of fundamental
rights and the rights of minorities, and the rule of law"
of this major legal text, "it is not sufficient in itself to
warrant the conclusion that the legal system conforms
to the principle of the rule of law". However, it is far
easier to say: "Let's have diversity in equality " than
make this come true. The dramatic circumstances in
which Croatia won its independence were definitely not
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an ideal framework for the assertion of diversity in equal-
ity. Civilising the principle of majority will be one of
the most urgent tasks for Croatia. And this will be best
reflected, among other things, in the stabilisation of the
belief that, for the assertion of the Republic of Croatia
as a state based on constitutional democracy, the only
"civilised solution" is to "permit 'diversity in equality',
that is, having equal citizens and at the same time pro-
tecting special groups so as to enable them to preserve
their identity, language and culture".
Closing remark
In the Afterword to his book "Proizvodnja ludila"
(The Production of Madness), Thomas S. Szasz says
that the social man fears the Other and strives to destroy
him; he needs the Other and, if necessary, he will create
him so that, by disparaging him as evil, he can establish
himself as good. Szasz illustrates this thesis by a story
from the "Painted Bird" by Jerzy Kosinsky, where the
painted bird stands as a symbol of the persecuted Other,
the Stranger, the Victim:
....One day he trapped a large raven. whose wings
he painted red. the breast green. and the tail blue. When
a flock of ravens appeared over our hut. Lekhfreed the
painted bird. As soon as it joined the flock a desperate
battle began. The changeling was attacked from all sides.
Black. red. green. blue feathers began to drop at our
feet. The ravens ran amuck in the skies. and suddenly
the painted raven plummeted to the fresh-ploughed soil.
It was still alive. opening its beak and vainly trying to
move its wings. Its eyes had been pecked out. and fresh
blood streamed over its painted feathers. It made yet
another attempt to flutter up from the sticky earth. but
its strength was gone.
The painted bird is a perfect symbol of the Other,
the Stranger, the Victim. With inimitable artistry, as Szasz
puts it, the author depicts both faces of this phenom-
enon: if the Other is not like the other members of the
flock, he is expelled from the group and destroyed; and
ifhe is like them, man intervenes and makes him appear
different, so that he may be cast out and destroyed. Bird-
painting, says Szasz, who is an adherent of the human-
istic anti-psychiatric trend of the late 1960s, has become
an accepted medical activity, and among the paints used,
the psychiatric diagnosis is the most fashionable one.
The metaphor of the Painted Bird has a definite
bearing on the overall issue of minorities, including mi-
nority rights. We believe, therefore, that the best way
for a state and for its internal laws, above all its consti-
tutional law, to avoid the Painted Bir.d syndrome with
respect to minority rights, especially the rights of ethnic
groups, is to adopt appropriate, consistent and effective
minority protection policies, combined with confidence-
building efforts and with cooperation with existing sov-
ereign states based on mutual respect for territorial in-
tegrity. •
